



This chapter explains the main conceptions of sexual difference that have influenced 
feminist theory, tracing their roots in the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan, then 
introducing the radical rethinking of sexual difference put forward by Luce Irigaray. 
For Irigaray, in the Western symbolic order there has only ever been sexual hierarchy, 
not genuine sexual difference. Her political program of changing the symbolic order 
to create a positive feminine subject-position – one that is not merely the underside or 
negative opposite of the masculine position – has been developed practically by some 
Italian feminists. Conceptions of sexual difference have also helped feminist theorists 
to rethink embodiment beyond the sex/gender distinction. The chapter concludes by 
considering how conceptions of sexual difference have made possible various current 
directions in feminist theory including the new ‘material feminisms’. 
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A family of related concepts of sexual difference has become part of feminist theory, 
stemming from two main sources: the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan and 
the work of the Belgian-born philosopher Luce Irigaray, herself also a practicing 
psychoanalyst. Ever since the 1970s their ideas of sexual difference have been 
embraced by some English-speaking feminist theorists, for a cluster of overlapping 
reasons. These reasons will provide the framework structuring this chapter, each 
being considered in turn. 
 First (Section 1), the concept of sexual difference has provided a framework 
within which to recognize that the psyche is not reducible to society, and that 
masculinity and femininity have deep and enduring roots in our psyches, being 
acquired together with the fundamental fantasies and mental agencies (of desire, 
repression, conscience, etc.) that compose our minds. Second (Section 2), the concept 
of sexual difference has enabled feminists to theorize the nature of the symbolic 
order. Not straightforwardly the same as society, a symbolic order is a set of 
fundamental, systematically organized meanings which structure our psyches across a 
diverse range of cultures and societies that all participate in the same order. Any 
symbolic order is embodied in language – which, not simply a neutral tool of 
communication, constitutes an overarching horizon of meaning and framework for 
experience – and in other ‘discursive and signifying systems’: visual art, religion, 
music, architecture – the whole ‘dimension of representations’ (Grosz 1990: 22). In 
the West, the order of meanings embodied across all these fields has revolved around 
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the hierarchical opposition man/woman, or so Irigaray and others have claimed. Third 
(Section 3), feminist analysis of the Western symbolic has generated a politics of 
sexual difference. Its aim is to change the symbolic order, and accompanying social 
practices, to create a positive feminine subject-position. Traditionally the West has 
ruled this out by construing woman merely as an inferior version of man – as when 
Freud judges the clitoris a defective, shrunken penis. Fourth (Section 4), the concept 
of sexual difference has helped feminists to rethink embodiment beyond the 
sex/gender distinction. Finally, there is a range of contemporary engagements with 
ideas of sexual difference (Section 5), including the new ‘material feminisms’ which 
both build on and critique sexual difference feminism’s approach to embodiment. 
 
1. Psychoanalytic Roots of the Concept of Sexual Difference 
 
Psychoanalysis is the key intellectual tradition through which the concept of sexual 
difference has entered feminist theory. So we must re-examine Freud’s account of 
masculinity and femininity and then Lacan’s revision of this account, which has been 
crucial to the feminist reception of psychoanalysis. 
 Freud came to pay serious attention to femininity only late in his intellectual 
career. Until then, he approached femininity in terms of the same theory of the 
Oedipus complex that he had originally developed with reference to little boys. 
Bracketing the many problems surrounding this theory, let us review its essentials. 
 For Freud, every young boy, from his third to fifth years, has sexual wishes for 
his mother and hates his rival, the father, whom the boy wishes to kill. These sexual 
wishes are not for intercourse specifically but for various, vaguely imagined, kinds of 
bodily intimacy with the mother. To punish the boy for these wishes he is threatened 
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with castration, either by the father or by others invoking his name. This threat 
eventually prompts the boy to dissolve his Oedipus complex. He represses his sexual 
wishes for his mother, henceforward letting them become conscious only in the form 
of desexualized affection. He also represses his rivalrous hatred for his father, in 
return for the assurance that he will grow up to be a father in his own right and to 
‘possess’ his own wife – a stand-in for his beloved mother. 
 Initially Freud assumed that the little girl has an inversely symmetrical 
Oedipus complex in which she has sexual wishes for her father and hatefully 
competes with her mother. Freud gradually abandoned that assumption. He set out his 
amended position in the 1925 essay ‘Some Psychical Consequences of the 
Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes’, 1931’s ‘Female Sexuality’ and 1933’s 
‘Femininity’ (see respectively Freud 1977a, 1977b, 1973). 
 Both girls and boys first love their mothers, Freud concedes now. This is 
presumably due to the social convention for women and mothers to be the primary 
child-carers, although Freud does not spell this out. Supposedly the girl loves her 
mother in the same ‘phallic’ way as the boy, wanting to perform sexual acts with her 
mother using her clitoris as if it were a penis. Whereas the boy relinquishes his love 
for his mother owing to the threat of castration, the five-year-old girl comes to reject 
her mother on ‘discovering’ that she and her mother are already castrated, lacking the 
penis. In hindsight the girl blames her mother for all her other disappointments – 
weaning, toilet-training, displacement by younger siblings, etc. 
 Now hating her mother, the girl becomes contemptuous of other women too, 
including herself. Assuming that she follows the path of ‘normal femininity’, she 
takes her father as her new love, wanting through him to access a penis. From now on, 
she has an Oedipus complex: she loves her father and hates her mother. The girl never 
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properly abandons this complex, for she cannot be propelled out of it by threats of 
castration. Rather her castration complex pushes her into the Oedipus complex and 
leaves her there – more or less. At best she realizes that she can never possess a penis 
and instead comes to wish to have a baby with first her father and then a father-
substitute – ideally a baby boy, through whom she can access a penis. 
 Implied by Freud’s work is a conceptual distinction between sexual difference 
and anatomical sex difference: sexual difference is not the same as sex difference but 
its psychical consequence.1 Sexual difference is between the different subject-
positions or sexed identities assumed by girls and boys and retained by women and 
men. These positions are composed of the different relationships that men and women 
adopt to others (e.g. loving versus hating their mothers), their different self-
perceptions (as future fathers or castrated), and different sets of desires and wishes 
(for a mother-substitute versus a penis). This psychical difference is sexual for Freud 
because it arises from the different courses of erotic development that girls and boys 
undergo, the different ways that their desires become structured and the different 
ways that their psyches become organized around these desires. 
 In specifying that children acquire sexed identities only through these tortuous 
courses of development, Freud takes it that children begin life without any stable 
sexed identities – they are originally polymorphous or bisexual, as he variously puts 
it. This too distinguishes sexual from sex difference: the latter is given at birth; the 
former acquired through complex, difficult processes. By implication sexed identity is 
never entirely stable or complete: because it always emerges from an individual’s pre-
                                                        
1 Freud does not make the distinction terminologically, except insofar as he speaks of 
‘anatomical sex difference’ (in German: anatomische Geschlechtsunterschied) as 
distinct from Geschlechtsunterschied as such. Moreover, he speaks not of subject-
positions – a later, yet still helpful term – but of ‘psychical maleness’ and ‘psychical 
femaleness’. 
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sexed past, everyone harbors psychical forces and desires that destabilize their 
acquired sexed identity. Even so, sexed identities generally endure – but despite the 
instabilities that continually beset them. Whereas sex is (we assume for now) fixed, 
sexed identities (and sexual difference) are precarious and volatile. 
 Since sexual difference is not anatomical but psychical (and eroticized, 
acquired, unstable), does sexual difference stand to sex as gender stands to sex? Is 
sexual difference just another word for gender? Let us see why not. 
 When the sex/gender distinction, first made by psychologists, was introduced 
into feminist thought, it was widely understood as follows. Sex is the biological 
difference between males and females; gender consists of societies’ different 
expectations and roles for males and females (e.g. to be aggressive versus peaceful) 
and the differences between men’s and women’s personalities as they become shaped 
by these expectations. Biological males and females become socially masculine and 
feminine as they become gendered. Many feminists embraced this sex/gender 
distinction because it meant that men’s and women’s personalities and social roles are 
shaped by social norms rather than being direct effects of biology. And whereas 
biology is fixed, roles and norms vary across societies (Oakley 1972: 128); therefore 
we can change these norms so that they stop steering men and women in opposed and 
unequal directions. 
 In contrast, Freud’s perspective is that the psyche has its own dynamics, 
possibilities and pathways, whatever gender norms prevail socially. Indeed, we only 
become responsive to either masculine or feminine roles on the basis of first acquiring 
the rudiments of a psychical identity as masculine or feminine. We do that by way of 
the castration and Oedipus complexes – stages that each individual must pass through 
psychically, regardless of their varied social situations. A core psychoanalytic insight, 
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then, is that the psyche and its development are not reducible to, but have a level of 
independence of, society. As such, the psychical difference between the sexes is not 
reducible to social gender difference. Rather, in every society this psychical 
difference must exist; each society must accommodate it in some way.2 
 Further, for Freud, the psyche is not reducible to the mind as opposed to the 
body – whereas, under the sex/gender distinction as it was initially understood, gender 
obtains in the mind, sex in the body. Freud instead treats the psyche and each of its 
component agencies (ego, superego, etc.) as an organization of ideas and physical 
energies at once. As ideas become stabilized into fixed patterns, so our corresponding 
physical energies become bound into desires, drives, patterns of activity, gestures, 
habits, etc. For example, when someone suffering from hysteria represses their sexual 
thoughts the blockage necessarily affects their body too: limbs may become 
paralyzed, speech impaired. Thus the psyche is simultaneously a bodily and mental 
formation. 
 Unfortunately, Freud compromises all these insights with his emphasis on the 
causal effects of anatomical sex difference, which makes it unclear how far the 
psyche has its own dynamics independent of biology, how unstable sexed identities 
are, and how far the body is something formed through and with the psyche. 
Moreover, Freud’s emphasis on anatomy creates a litany of problems that initially 
impeded feminists from developing his insights. He takes it that girls love their 
mothers ‘phallically’; that the penis is the only valued sexual organ; that both sexes                                                         
2 Because sexual difference is neither social nor biological, (English-speaking) sexual 
difference feminists tend not to use the same clear distinctions masculine/male and 
feminine/female that sex/gender feminists do. Instead, sexed identity as (say) a woman 
is sometimes described as just that, at other times as feminine or female identity. 
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inevitably see the female body as ‘castrated’ (this sight brings the castration threat 
home to boys); and that women’s whole emotional lives revolve around ‘penis-envy’. 
 Feminist hostility to Freud persisted until the mid-1970s when Juliet 
Mitchell’s 1974 book Psychoanalysis and Feminism prompted a sea-change. 
Mitchell’s central point is that Freud gives us a largely accurate description of what it 
is to become a woman under patriarchy (Mitchell 1974: xiii). In a civilization that 
accords superior status to fathers (patriarchy means ‘rule of the father’) and so, too, to 
men and symbols of paternal and masculine status, girls cannot avoid learning that, 
being female, they are of lesser status. Coming to measure female bodies by 
masculine standards, girls judge themselves defective and second-rate. Freud’s 
mistake was to portray this process as the effect of anatomy and not culture. 
 Mitchell was informed by the revision of psychoanalysis developed by 
Jacques Lacan in France, particularly in his ‘structuralist’ phase of the 1950s and 
1960s, crystallized in his 1966 Écrits (Lacan 2002). Although Lacan claimed to return 
to Freud, in fact he shifted the focus of psychoanalysis away from biology to language 
and culture, rethinking the castration and Oedipus complexes as reflecting the 
structure of language, not the facts of anatomy. Because Lacan thus moved away from 
Freud’s view that women’s inferiority is biologically determined, Mitchell and many 
other feminist theorists found Lacanian psychoanalysis useful. 
 For Freud, the castration threat was issued by the father or in his name. From 
this Lacan takes the idea that there is a paternal function, which is to say ‘no’ (he 
calls this the Non/Nom-du-Père), to prohibit the bodily union with the mother for 
which the child wishes (Lacan 2002: 208). Lacan equates this paternal ‘no’ with the 
incest taboo, the universal taboo that separates culture from nature. This taboo is 
common to all cultures and societies – and to all the systems of kin relations by which 
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we demarcate ourselves from animals. In all such systems, kin positions are defined in 
relation to one another: only father may have sex with mother, thus the position of the 
father is always to say ‘no’. For the child to grasp these meanings father, mother, 
child, no, is to enter language and its system of distinctions (Lacan 2002: 66). 
 These points depend on Lacan’s structuralist view that language is neither a 
neutral tool of communication nor a simple vehicle for expressing pre-existing ideas 
that in turn mirror the external world. Rather, for Lacan, language shapes how we see 
the world, constituting a horizon of meaning by which all experience is mediated. 
Each language does this by virtue of being a complete system of differences: each 
term gains meaning from its differences from and relations to all the others. For 
example, in French mouton can mean sheep or mutton, conveying a different view of 
sheep – as always potential meat – to English, which distinguishes the two terms. 
Kinship terms, then, do not simply describe pre-existing positions but establish kin 
positions with particular valences. Kinship is not separate from but entwined with the 
whole system of linguistic meanings which, in turn, organizes all our experience.  
 In sum: fundamental to acquiring language is learning the meanings of the 
basic kinship positions that define each individual’s place in the world; this requires 
learning that only father may desire mother, thus grasping the ban on union with the 
mother. Thus the father – as a symbolic figure – represents civilization and culture 
and is ‘the original representative of the Law’s authority’ (Lacan 2002: 299). This 
‘father’ is not the empirical, actually existing father (if indeed the child has one), who 
need not issue any threats. What matters is that the father have symbolic status as the 
one who alone may ‘have’ the mother, and that individuals and culture at large relay 
this to the child – perhaps by having ‘church fathers’, paternal heads of state, 
celebrating a culture’s warriors and revolutionaries. Any civilization needs some 
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arrangements to perform this paternal function of lifting the child out of his initial 
attachment to the mother into public, social life. 
 Lacan recasts the Oedipus complex as the wish to occupy the symbolic 
father’s position and have its central emblem, the phallus, not the anatomical penis. 
Lacan says many things about the phallus: it is the badge of paternal status, of the 
father’s sexual desire for the mother, and of the complete union with the mother that 
only the father may enjoy. The castration complex, in turn, centers on the child’s 
realization that he or she may not occupy the father’s position, or lacks the phallus. 
Even the little boy undergoes this kind of castration. Henceforward he wishes to 
acquire paternal status (likely by rebelling against the society’s symbolic fathers – for 
the rebel claims authority against those in power; law and rebellion are 
interdependent). Yet no boy or man can ever attain paternal status psychically, for 
Lacan, for each man takes the father’s ‘no’ into his psyche, where it becomes the core 
of his superego (the prohibitive, punitive moral agency in the psyche) and of the 
idealized internal father-figure against which each man judges himself inadequate. 
Because the phallus symbolizes both what we want to have and that which we lack 
just in wanting it, it also comes to stand for our lack of paternal status, our castration. 
 For Lacan girls, too, must enter civilization by way of the Name-of-the-Father. 
To exit the pre-verbal bond with the mother and enter broader social life, mediated by 
language, the girl as much as the boy must relate to the paternal ideal – not to a 
maternal one, for the mother stands for the pre-social realm that must be exited. In the 
nature of language, then, the only possible subject-position is one arranged under the 
‘paternal function’: to become a speaking subject is to become a masculine subject. 
Structural linguistic constraints forbid women from existing as specifically feminine 
subjects, from speaking or desiring in any specifically female way. 
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 In what sense, then, do women become feminine? The answer is that they can 
never fully assume the position of (masculine) subject but on entering language 
become, effectively, split between their subjectivity and their femininity, which 
locates them as objects, not subjects, of desire and speech. This happens through the 
role of the phallus. While the phallus is not the penis, it still constrains girls to 
undergo castration on different terms to boys. By (however mistakenly) equating his 
penis with the phallus, the boy can position himself as lacking and desiring to attain 
the paternal position of having the mother or woman. Unable to likewise represent 
and experience her desire as phallic because she has no penis, the girl is constrained 
to assume a different relation to the paternal phallus. The only available option here is 
to (strive to be) the object of the father’s or man’s phallic desire. Insofar as the girl 
takes up this feminine position, she is object; insofar as she speaks, desires, etc., she is 
(effectively) masculine. 
 We may take from Lacan’s work several overarching points. First, that sexual 
difference is both the symbolic difference between the positions father/man and 
mother/woman – which map onto the difference subject/object – and the psychical 
difference between subjects who assume these distinct positions. Language and 
psyche thus interlock; Lacan calls their total complex the ‘symbolic order’. Sexual 
difference as it exists within this order is reducible neither to biological sex difference 
nor to social gender as social norms define it; rather, sexual difference is symbolic, 
that is, at once linguistic and psychical. Being linguistic, sexual difference arises in 
the break with pre-verbal nature through which we which enter civilization, so that 
our sexed identities are always insecure, incomplete, defined in different ways by our 
confrontation with lack and insufficiency rather than giving us any sense of sexed 
wholeness. 
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 Various feminist theorists in the 1970s and 1980s took forward Lacan’s 
emphasis that sexed identity is never complete, campaigning relentlessly against any 
notion of being a ‘whole woman’ or ‘whole man’ (see, especially, Adams and Cowie 
1992). Yet for Lacan the symbolic order that regulates these incomplete identities is 
fixed for all time. The paternal ‘no’ must be law and the phallus the ‘master signifier’ 
in every society – any society that does not meet these constraints faces collapse. 
Lacan holds out no prospect of changing the exclusion of women as women from 
civilization, then: despite their incompleteness, our sexed identities are here to stay. 
 This problem stems from the concept of sexual difference as it has taken shape 
in Lacan. Positively, the concept highlights that our psyches and systems of meaning 
have their own organization, not reducible to that of society; rather, there are 
constraints on the psyche and on possible systems of meaning which all societies must 
accommodate. However, negatively, Lacan puts at the centre of these constraints the 
necessity of separating from the mother with reference to a paternal ideal. Given this 
constraint, any language and any system of psychical organization must leave women 
split between speaking subjectivity and objectified femininity, something that no 
change to social gender norms can overcome.  
 We might escape these problems by abandoning psychoanalysis or reworking 
it without the concept of sexual difference.3 But then we lose the insights that the                                                         
3 Nancy Chodorow (1978) reframes sexual difference as the gender difference 
between girls and boys that results from social conditions in which only women 
mother while men are breadwinners. Because mothers unconsciously identify more 
with their daughters while pushing their sons away, girls develop personalities that are 
empathetic, caring, with a blurred sense of self, while boys become abstract, detached, 
independent. Thus the gender division of labor becomes reproduced in the 
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concept distils: that the psyche has its own dynamics, powered by the complex 
processes by which we acquire sexed identities that are always fluctuating and 
unstable; and that these psychical dynamics are bound up with deep-lying structures 
of meaning that overarch particular linguistic and social variations. We are left with 
an ‘impasse’ between feminism and psychoanalysis (Brennan 1991), between the 
insights of psychoanalysis and the feminist project of effecting social change. It was 
chiefly Luce Irigaray whose work broke this deadlock.  
 
2. Luce Irigaray’s Philosophy of Sexual Difference 
 
The foremost philosopher of sexual difference, Irigaray’s work has massively 
influenced feminist thought – particularly her earlier work of the 1970s, translated and 
imported into the English-speaking world from the 1980s onwards.4 Initially Irigaray 
belonged to Lacan’s psychoanalytic school, the Parisian École Freudienne, but she 
was expelled because, throughout her earlier writings, she (indirectly) criticizes Lacan 
for falsely raising patriarchy into the universal condition of human civilization. 
 Even so, Irigaray finds in Lacan the basis of a radical critique of Western 
civilization for its exclusion of any possibility of women speaking, thinking or acting 
as women. The symbol of subjectivity, the phallus, is modeled on a male body part; 
no female body part provides an equivalent symbol inspiring women to speak and                                                                                                                                                               
personalities of each generation. Through shared parenting, Chodorow argues, the 
cycle could be broken. However, Parveen Adams (1981), a Lacanian, rightly criticizes 
Chodorow for reducing psychical to social processes. 
4 Irigaray is reluctant to embrace the label ‘feminism’, but has been received as 
contributing to it nonetheless. 
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desire specifically as women. This is indicative of how woman has been cast as 
object, not subject, with the position of speaking, thinking subject exclusively male: 
‘any theory of the “subject” will have always been appropriated as “masculine”’ 
(Irigaray 1985a: 133). More broadly, the feminine has been construed only as the 
negative, inferior version, or opposite of the masculine: always defined in relation to, 
against, and beneath the masculine, paradigmatically as object in contrast to the 
masculine subject. ‘The “female” is always described as deficiency, atrophy, lack of 
the sex that has a monopoly on value: the male sex’ (Irigaray 1985b: 69). 
 These hierarchical meanings of male and female, masculine and feminine, are 
at the core of the Western symbolic order. They organize a whole set of binary 
oppositions that make up this order, i.e. the underlying structure of meaning that 
constitutes the backbone of Western culture – contrasts of mind/body, culture/nature, 
reason/emotion, reality/appearance, truth/deception, good/evil, active/passive, 
order/chaos. All are shot through with sexed meaning: women are closer to nature, are 
all liars, at the mercy of their emotions, etc.5 Being female has not been the source of                                                         
5 As Hélène Cixous puts it: 










an independent subjective identity but merely the inverse of being male, which has 
been taken to be a positive identity. Women can escape their second-rate condition 
only by positioning themselves as non-feminine: perhaps as sex-neutral reasoners or 
speakers (yet who in fact are covertly taking up a masculine position from which their 
femininity always threatens to drag them down). 
 Irigaray concludes that no real sexual difference has ever existed at the 
symbolic level, in the sense that it is only as a man that one has been able to be a 
thinking, speaking, acting subject. Rather than genuine difference, there has only ever 
been hierarchy and binary opposition between 1 and 0, where 1 is male, 0 the female 
construed as mere lack. Irigaray nevertheless refers to this traditional refusal of 
genuine difference as sexual difference, under the hierarchical, oppositional 
interpretation it has had up to now.  
 Contrary to Lacan, Irigaray argues that this symbolic order that has ruled the 
West is only one of many possible symbolic orders. Our particular order originated in 
classical Greece. She refers here to the tragic trilogy the Oresteia, by Aeschylus 
(Irigaray 1991). The hero, Orestes, kills his mother Clytemnestra in revenge for her 
murdering his father Agamemnon. The Athenian court eventually acquits Orestes, 
making the ‘murder of the mother’ a founding principle of the classical social order. 
For Irigaray this exemplifies how, at this point in history, a particular ‘imaginary’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
Intelligible/Palpable ...  
Man     
Woman 
     Always the same metaphor: ... wherever discourse is organized. (Cixous 
1986: 63) 
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became law (1988: 159) – that is, was articulated into the symbolic order that has 
prevailed since.  
 By an ‘imaginary’, Irigaray means a structured, interrelated set of fantasies, 
where a fantasy consists of ideas about what we wish for conjoined with bodily 
energies that charge and eroticize them. The fantasies informing the Western 
symbolic are, like all our most fundamental fantasies, very deep-seated and not under 
our conscious control; they concern the figures of the mother and father, and arise, 
Irigaray holds, from the peculiar difficulties that little boys face after their birth 
(Irigaray 1995: 107-8). All small children struggle to separate themselves from their 
mothers emotionally and establish a sense that they differ from their mothers in mind 
and body. But unlike girls, boys are born of women who differ from them in sex. The 
separation from the mother that boys need to make is therefore sharper than for girls. 
So boys become motivated to sever all ties with their mothers at an emotional and 
fantasy level, and to devalue the mother and all that she stands for: the body, 
dependency, close relationships, passions. Effectively, boys wish to deny that they 
lose anything by separating from the mother by casting her entire realm as valueless 
and as a realm to which boys never truly belonged anyway. 
 To accomplish this, boys raise the father-figure into the bearer of all the values 
that they set against the mother and the world of dependent infancy that she stands 
for: disembodiment; independence; separateness from others; reason as opposed to 
emotion. The boy aspires to embody these values, projected onto an idealized paternal 
position. When these fantasies are expressed as a symbolic order, culture becomes 
structured by binary oppositions set out along sexed lines, as illustrated by documents 
such as the Oresteia. Hence the patriarchal symbolic order described by Lacan – but 
Irigaray has now traced its roots in the little boy’s early relation with his mother.  
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 By seeing the symbolic order as an expression of (male) fantasies, Irigaray re-
emphasizes the bodily roots of meaning, which had become somewhat lost in Lacan’s 
work and its initial feminist reception. Ideas and bodily energies converge in 
fantasies, so that we have a stubborn corporeal attachment to them. The fantasies that 
underlie the Western symbolic order concern the mother and father as bodily figures, 
for this is how we experience them in infancy. The symbolic man/woman opposition 
that expresses these fantasies thus attributes hierarchical meanings to male and female 
bodies – as when Plato took the female womb and genitals as his model for the cave 
of sensory ignorance and illusion in which he believes we are all trapped.  
 But how does Irigaray think that the symbolic order can be changed, if it 
expresses male fantasies to which boys are drawn because they are born male of 
female mothers? Irigaray’s view that symbolic change is possible rests on her belief 
that the relation between symbolic and imaginary is reciprocal. As Margaret Whitford 
puts it in her exposition of Irigaray, the imaginary is a ‘magma’ (Whitford 1991: 57) 
that only becomes molded into definite shape when expressed as a symbolic order. 
Prior to this kind of expression, fantasies are not fully definite and determinate; they 
are fleeting, mobile. Boys’ infant situation inclines them towards certain fantasies, 
then, but these only settle into a fixed pattern through being expressed symbolically. 
So, we could channel our fantasies into different configurations if we changed our 
symbolic order. 
 Indeed, because the symbolic order structures our fantasies, which draw on 
drive-energies, we come to incorporate this order into our bodies. Our energies and 
desires become fixed into definite patterns affecting how we move, feel, act. For a 
woman to apprehend that being feminine is something defective, an inferior version 
of the masculine, is to come to live and feel this status in her body, perhaps as a 
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visceral dislike or shame of her own body manifested, say, in eating disorders or 
shamefully hiding parts of her body. Irigaray understands this process of 
incorporation using the term ‘morphology’ (or ‘imaginary morphology’), by which 
she refers both to collective cultural meanings surrounding our sexed bodies and to 
the resulting ways that we, as individuals, come to experience, feel and lived our 
bodies. A body’s morphology – from the Greek terms morphe, form, and logos, 
meaning – is its meaning and energetic patterns.  
 But what motivation do we have to change the symbolic order, if it structures 
our fantasies and bodies so that we are emotionally attached to patriarchy? 
Fortunately the imaginary-symbolic fit is never total and seamless. Our psyches 
always contain imaginary elements that go beyond the expressive resources of the 
symbolic. Men have psychical remnants of their early attachments to their mothers; 
and women’s fantasy lives, of their many kinds, find only partial outlet in the current 
symbolic. For example, as the little girl learns that being female is a second-class 
status she turns against her mother. Thus the girl’s feelings of aggression and hostility 
towards her mother gain symbolic expression, but not her earlier attachment to and 
love for her mother – or her love for her own body qua female. Thus, much of 
women’s potential desires, fantasies, self-love, bodily feelings has no morphology at 
present, because our symbolic order gives it no outlet. 
 To change the symbolic order, we need to activate and express these 
alternative elements in our psyches and bodies. To this end Irigaray (1985b) puts 
forward imagery of women’s ‘two lips’ – two sets of lips, oral and genital – touching 
one another, constantly communicating. A counter-symbol to the phallus, the ‘two 
lips’ raises women’s anatomy into a sign of how women can speak specifically as 
women. The image is also intended to provide an expressive vehicle through which 
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female self-love, self-esteem, and desire can come into culture – through which the 
female body can attain its own morphology. 
 This shows us what particular kind of symbolic change Irigaray favors. In her 
view, we need to create a culture of sexual difference – not a gender-neutral culture, 
but one that recognizes and celebrates genuine sexual difference for the first time. 
Being female-bodied must be completely re-imagined as the basis of a positive 
identity in its own right. Then, being a woman would mean being a particular kind of 
speaking, thinking, acting subject, whose speech embodies a distinctively feminine set 
of fantasies and bodily processes. Reciprocally, male identity needs to be re-imagined 
as a specific identity: one of two, not the only one.  
 We see why Irigaray declares that ‘Women’s exploitation is based upon sexual 
difference; its solution will only come about through sexual difference’ (1993: 12). 
The problem is sexual difference as the West has understood it – as a lack of genuine 
difference, a binary opposition. The solution is genuine sexual difference, to come 
about through the creation of a symbolic order that recognizes it at last.  
 In sum, for Irigaray, the West has basic symbolic meanings concerning male 
and female, father and mother, which organize a whole series of binary oppositions 
reflected in all the more manifest representational schemes found in this culture. 
These basic meanings define sexual difference in the first of the complex of senses 
that this term has for Irigaray, namely the symbolic difference (hierarchy) between 
male and female. In this first sense, sexual difference is the difference between men 
and women, male and female, as it is imagined, fantasized and symbolized in Western 
culture. Second, sexual difference is also the psychical difference between actual men 
and women – their different fantasies, desires, inner lives – a difference that results 
from their assuming the positions male or female as the symbolic order defines them. 
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Since the psyche is in part bodily, this difference includes the embodied difference 
between being male and being female as we experience it at a felt, bodily level. 
 Sexual difference as Irigaray understands it differs from social gender in 
several ways. As a symbolic and imaginary contrast, sexual difference expresses 
deep-seated fantasies that are not straightforwardly social in origin, if by ‘society’ we 
mean a set of collective arrangements into which each individual comes and by which 
he or she is shaped. Rather, our shared fantasies about sexual difference originate in 
the (male) subject in response to his earliest relationships with others, primarily his 
mother. These relationships are interpersonal, arising between subjects, and reflecting 
the inside of the subject as much as or more than the public life that frames 
interpersonal relationships. So, insofar as the symbolic order has roots in the psychic 
life of the subject, it is not directly social, for as Irigaray says, ‘the human subject, 
woman or man, is not a mere social effect’ (Irigaray and Lotringer 2000: 11). 
Furthermore, for Irigaray, men and women assume different subject-positions by 
taking on these symbolic meanings, a process that establishes our basic identities as 
men and women (boys and girls). Only having taken on the rudiments of these 
identities do we then come to respond to and take on particular – socially and 
historically changing – gender norms. Moreover, our sexed identities are psychical 
and bodily, unlike gender roles which are taken on by the mind rather than the body.  
 Even so, shifting our attention from gender norms to sexual difference may 
seem unhelpful. The shift is to a highly abstract level of analysis, away from practical 
problems such as unequal pay or domestic violence. Indeed, the theoretical 
abstraction of Irigaray’s earlier work has been criticized. Perhaps in response, she 
made her writing of the later 1980s more practical, sketching out a politics of sexual 
difference. Let us turn to this. 
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3. The Politics of Sexual Difference 
 
The politics of sexual difference is defined, above all, in opposition to a politics of 
pursuing equality for women. The aim of equality politics – associated with the liberal 
feminism of groups such as the National Organization for Women – is to enable 
women to participate equally in the public worlds of paid work and politics. This 
requires, first, securing women’s formal legal equality with men (rights to equal pay, 
against sexual discrimination, etc.) and then real, substantial equality. The latter 
requires dismantling the panoply of informal barriers that hold women back: such as 
the unequal distribution of housework and childcare, which remain largely women’s 
work; implicit biases against women held by appointments and promotions panels; 
long hours cultures and old boys’ networks in politics and business. 
 Irigaray’s rhetorical question to the proponents of this politics is: Equal to 
whom? The equality sought is with men: the aim of equality politics is to bring 
women into spheres that have been historically defined as the province of men, a 
definition that has shaped their structure and significance. Paid work, politics, etc., do 
not lose these entrenched masculine connotations just because women enter into 
them. Instead, women entering these fields become forced to comply with their pre-
existing masculine meanings and to model themselves on men – as when female 
politicians such as Margaret Thatcher or Sarah Palin adopt the same belligerent 
rhetoric and policies as (many) male politicians. From Irigaray’s perspective, far from 
challenging patriarchy, equality politics reinforces it by perpetuating the age-old 
system that recognizes only one ideal, the masculine, to which men and women alike 
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must aspire. Thus Irigaray (and other sexual difference feminists) complain that 
pursuing equality means pursuing sameness – making women the same as men. 
 This criticism may seem unfair to equality politics. Arguably women cannot 
achieve real equality unless the institutions that they enter change, perhaps to 
recognize and incorporate women’s difference. Treating men and women equally may 
require that they be treated differently in some respects. For example, perhaps women 
need paid maternity leave, the option of flexible work schedules, state-subsidized 
childcare at every workplace, and facilities at work for caring for babies, before they 
can hope to participate equally in paid work, given their ‘difference’ – in this case the 
special responsibility for childcare that society (and maybe to an extent biology) 
assigns to women. However, such provisions, intended to further women’s inclusion 
in the public sphere, may reinforce the very ‘difference’ that hinders women from 
achieving full inclusion. 
 Either way, the politics of sexual difference is not a politics of difference in 
this last sense. Sexual difference feminists do not aim to reshape social institutions so 
that they value, celebrate, recognize or support women’s difference as it already 
exists, because for these feminists this is not a genuine difference. Women’s 
traditional role as mothers, for instance, is just one way in which women have been 
defined in relation to men, as good women if they love and care for men (e.g. the 
Virgin Mary caring for baby Jesus), bad women if they harm men or male interests. 
Motherhood has been seen not as a possible part of female subjectivity but as a mere 
‘function’, that of providing the caring background in which (infant male) subjectivity 
takes shape. To accommodate this or other traditional differences of women would be 
just another way of perpetuating patriarchy. 
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 Still, in defense again of equality politics, we might wonder whether achieving 
real equality for women requires a more wholesale transformation of the institutions 
of paid work and politics – not so as to accommodate differences that have been 
heaped exclusively onto women but so as to treat all individuals differently than 
under traditional, gender-divided practice. Workplaces could be restructured to 
assume that all paid workers also care for family members and to value the same. 
Sexual difference feminists would agree that radical transformation is needed – but of 
what kind? For them, the goal is not to treat all individuals alike but to create social 
structures that recognize genuine sexual difference and, by doing so, create it for the 
first time. Whereas equality feminists tend ultimately to valorize a gender-neutral 
future, sexual difference feminists valorize a future symbolic order of two sexes. 
Their aim is to invent new social practices to make that order a reality. 
 Irigaray’s proposals in this regard are mainly for new laws. She says that we 
must go about ‘Redefining rights appropriate to the two sexes to replace abstract 
rights appropriate to non-existent neutral individuals, and enshrining these rights in 
the law ... civil law must be changed to give both sexes their own identities as 
citizens’ (Irigaray 1994, xv-xvi). In particular, she proposes, women should have (1) 
the right to economic equality and equal representation on all civil and religious 
bodies, (2) the right to defend their own cultures and traditions, (3) the right to 
‘human dignity’, especially through positive representations of women in public 
places, and (4) rights to choose motherhood freely and to enjoy ‘physical and moral 
integrity’ (1993: 86-89). These legal rights are intended to begin the work of creating 
a positive identity for women as women. Thus, Irigaray envisages the proposed equal 
representation of women on all civil and religious bodies in terms of women’s 
representation there as women, who could as such contribute to these bodies from 
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distinctly female perspectives (starting to create those perspectives just by articulating 
them). Irigaray is not opposed to women entering the professions or agencies of 
government, indeed she advocates this – but she seeks ways that they can do so as 
women, without having to relinquish their femininity. 
 Further applications of the politics of sexual difference can be found in the 
history of Italian feminism. While Italy, like other countries, has always contained 
various feminist currents, from the late 1970s and 1980s onwards several Italian 
groups began to raise sexual difference into one such political current. Importing 
psychoanalytic and philosophical ideas along with US radical feminism and Irigaray, 
these Italians (of whom Adriana Cavarero is best known to English speakers – see, 
e.g., Cavarero 1995) moved away from directly socio-economic issues to pursue a 
radical transformation of the fundamental structures of subjectivity and meaning. The 
entire social world was to be reshaped to accommodate two different kinds of subject. 
This project manifested itself concretely in a range of ways. 
 For example, in 1986 L’Unità called for women to demonstrate in response to 
the disastrous nuclear ‘accident’ at Chernobyl, which was, L’Unità declared, the 
predictable result of a scientific practice detached from material life and abstracted 
from our bodies, bodies that are necessarily sexed (Bono and Kemp 1991: 317). Since 
our thought, therefore, is in fact sexed – the product of the thinking activity of 
embodied, sexed beings – such science only masquerades as disembodied while really 
expressing the destructive priorities of the male sex, contrary to ‘a way of thinking 
which cares about life ... [that] has always been with women’ (318). Such statements 
fed into heated debate about whether the demonstrators demonized men and falsely 
exalted women. Lia Melandri objected that women are complicit with modern science 
and its outcomes (328-9). Members of the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective – 
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one of the main Italian groups articulating the politics of sexual difference – replied 
that, even so, women are still complying with institutions made by and for men. Plus, 
the Collective added, there are always parts of women’s desire that go beyond and can 
turn women against the existing order (330). 
 The Collective developed various strategies for bringing about a culture of 
sexual difference. One was the controversial practice of affidamento – ‘entrustment’ 
or ‘custody’ (see Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective 1990; Zerilli 2004). The idea 
is that women can only fully realize their talents and abilities if they accept and use 
their inequalities (of age, status, etc.), rather than stifling women’s potentials in the 
name of a fictitious equality. A younger or junior woman should place herself under 
the custody or tutelage of a woman her superior in age or professional standing, from 
whom she learns how to realize her potential as a woman, with reference to a female 
role model. At a broader cultural level, too, women are to recognize female 
authorities – ‘symbolic mothers’. This position led to the establishment of women’s 
bookstores and libraries in various cities, publishing houses devoted to women’s 
writing, and the Virginia Woolf Cultural Centre in Rome. These institutions embody 
the ideal of a symbolic mother – a female bearer of authority and knowledge – whose 
position women can aspire to occupy as women. 
 Having said all this about the specificity of feminism of sexual difference, its 
partisans may ultimately remain committed to women’s equality in a fundamental 
moral sense. After all, they want women to be treated, at a moral level, as subjects 
fully equal with men – but, they add, this requires women to have a sexuate identity in 
their own right, so that women cease to count only as second-class men. Even so, 
sexual difference feminists might reply that their goal is not equality because the 
generally accepted meaning of gender equality is treating all individuals alike. At the 
 26 
least, sexual difference feminists are transforming the meaning of equality; if the 
language of equality masks this transformation, then it is best avoided. Anyway, what 
is clear is that, abstract and theoretical as it is, the concept of sexual difference has 
sparked a range of political interventions and strategies that have fed into feminism’s 
diversity and vitality. 
  
4. Sexed Bodies: Beyond the Sex/Gender Distinction 
 
The concept of sexual difference has sometimes been defended on the grounds that it 
advances beyond perceived problems with the sex/gender distinction. So argues 
Moira Gatens, in particular, in her ‘Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ (Gatens 
[1983] 1996: ch. 1), a paper which has been very influential and remains important. 
 For Gatens, the sex/gender distinction has several problems. It sharply 
distinguishes the biological body from the mind, taking it that it is through our minds 
that we take on gender norms (1996: 9). The distinction suggests that our gender is 
taken into our personalities without this process having any intrinsic connection with 
our bodies, which sit inertly by whilst gender acquisition takes place. 
Thus, the distinction is a legacy of Descartes’ mind/body dualism. Feminists, though, 
should be wary of mind/body dualism, which is continuous with the long-standing 
symbolic hierarchy that aligns body with woman and mind with man. In addition, 
Gatens maintains, the sex/gender distinction comes close to suggesting that the mind 
is a blank slate at birth onto which ‘social lessons’ concerning gender are written (4). 
 Gatens’s proposed alternative, which she couches in terms of sexual 
difference, has affinities with Irigaray’s position. For Gatens, gender norms are 
actually bound up with value-laden interpretations of the meanings of male and 
 27 
female bodies which are held at a social, imaginary level (1996: 9). For example, the 
gender norm that women should not be aggressive reflects our social imaginary that 
pictures the female body as nurturing, peaceful and maternal. It is because the female 
body is so imagined that a corresponding set of gender norms arises (13). Thus, 
Gatens says, it is not the case that our social institutions simply value those traits that 
are deemed normal (or normative) for masculinity, such as scientific and reasoning 
skills. In that case those traits would equally be valued in women who succeed at 
science or reasoning. In fact, Gatens points out (9), society values the masculine male 
– the traits deemed normal for masculinity are only valued when men display them. If 
women – those with female bodies – do display those traits, excelling at science or 
reasoning for example, then their doing so is not valued but condemned for making 
them un-femininine (cold, unattractive, etc.). 
 Gatens further argues that, as individuals, we take on gender norms and 
imaginary meanings concerning the significance of sexed bodies at a bodily as much 
as a mental level. Indeed, we should not regard the mind and body as separate entities. 
We have already seen that Freud and Irigaray view the psyche as an organization of 
ideas and bodily energies both. Gatens adds insights into embodiment developed 
within the phenomenological tradition. Central for Gatens is the approach of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2002). 
For Merleau-Ponty, I both have my body – as an object that I can perceive as if from 
without, as a third party can – and am my body – the one perceiving my body is that 
same body, as a living, sentient being imbued with vital awareness of itself.  
 On this basis Gatens suggests that it is as a body – the body that I am – that I 
apprehend, make sense of and internalize gender norms and imaginary meanings 
(1996: 11). I take these collective meanings into myself-as-body, where they become 
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the meaning that my body has for me at an ongoing everyday level. Because the two 
sides of my embodiment (having and being my body) co-exist inseparably, these 
meanings come to saturate my body in its objective, perceptible aspect: they seep into 
my body’s ingrained habits, skills and patterns of movement, its gestures and 
properties. Thus women learn, for instance, to move differently to men – perhaps in a 
more restrained and modest way. 
 Gatens couches this position in terms of sexual difference in part because of 
its political implications. She opposes the politics of ‘degendering’ that, she believes, 
flows from the sex/gender distinction (1996: 5). According to that politics, we should 
dismantle and eradicate gender norms so that all individuals are treated alike, their sex 
being seen to have no rightful bearing on how people are treated: social life should, as 
far as possible, be abstracted from our bodies with their sex differences. Gatens 
objects, first, that this politics of neutralizing the body reflects our culture’s long-
running male/female hierarchy, because this politics values what is symbolically male 
– mind, culture, society – over what is symbolically female – bodies. Second, she 
objects, this politics neglects the fact that we are our bodies, which as such are not 
merely biological objects (as the sex/gender distinction assumes) but are also the 
living individuals that we are. As such, no society can realistically hope to divest our 
bodies of significance (1994: 9). 
 We therefore need a different politics, one that starts by recognizing the 
inescapable significance of our sexed bodies but that strives to change the meanings 
attached to them, to render these meanings non-hierarchical. This politics championed 
by Gatens has clear links with the politics of sexual difference as articulated by 
Irigaray and others. Gatens, however, does not endorse the goal of changing the 
symbolic order to recognize two genuinely different sexes. For Gatens, our goal is 
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more to change the meanings of male and female bodies so that they cease to be pitted 
in sharp opposition to one another and are re-imagined as overlapping along a 
spectrum (1996: 52). 
 It has been objected that Gatens is unfair to the sex/gender distinction. For Val 
Plumwood (1989), the sex/gender distinction does not inherently involve mind/body 
dualism as Gatens claims. Rather, Plumwood contends, ‘gender’ has always referred 
to the different norms and meanings expected of and attributed to females and males, 
who take on these norms at an embodied level, as specifying how they should be as 
female- or male-bodied individuals. For Plumwood, the sex/gender distinction already 
essentially accommodates all that Gatens says. 
 Another alternative, adopted by Judith Butler in her earlier work (e.g. Butler 
1990), is to redeploy a sharp sex/gender distinction but in a newly radical way. 
Ordinarily, Butler maintains, it is assumed that an individual must have the gender 
that ‘fits’ their sex: females must be feminine, males masculine. Effectively, gender is 
expected to express sex. For Butler, the sex/gender distinction allows us to question 
this paradigm (the ‘heterosexual matrix’), a harmful paradigm that marginalizes or 
makes ‘unintelligible’ all those who, in various ways, are transgressively gendered or 
sexed – including the intersexed,6 transsexuals, those whose gender does not ‘fit’ their 
sex, and those whose sexuality does not ‘fit’ their sex or gender. For Butler, the 
sex/gender distinction opens up a positive alternative: it entails that any gender can go 
along with any sex – a woman can be masculine, a man feminine; a woman can desire 
women, a man men; gender need not be polarized as when it is expected to ‘follow’                                                         
6 Until now I have spoken as if, biologically, everyone were either male or female, but 
a minority of people are born intersexed. Whether sexual difference theory can 
adequately accommodate this or any other variation on sexual duality is debated. 
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sex, and a range of gender expressions can proliferate. From Butler’s perspective 
there is more radical potential in the sex/gender distinction than Gatens allows – 
indeed, the distinction enables a politics of gender subversion that is ultimately more 
liberating than the politics of sexual difference. 
 
5. Further Directions 
 
Ideas of sexual difference have had a wide-ranging influence on contemporary 
feminist theory, and not only on those who explicitly embrace sexual difference 
feminism. The irreducibility of psyche to society; the embodied nature of the psyche 
and the inescapable significance of our sexed bodies; the symbolic disparity between 
men and women; language as a horizon of meaning rather than a neutral tool for 
communication – all these ideas are widely, although not universally, accepted. 
 Yet there have been major criticisms of the concept of sexual difference. 
Butler suggests that the construction of sexual difference as a hierarchy, while 
problematic in itself, may also mask a still-deeper exclusion of sexual minorities who 
defy or subvert the sexed binary. Another problem is that sexual difference feminists 
tend to regard sexual difference, not class or race, as the fundamental social-symbolic 
problem – Irigaray is explicit that ‘the problem of race’ is ‘secondary’ (1996: 47). To 
prioritize one form of oppression in this way unhelpfully pits the oppressed against 
one another and, plausibly, is misguided: gender oppression is not obviously more 
fundamental to the modern capitalist order than class or race. 
 More constructively, sexual difference feminism has enabled a host of new 
currents in feminist thinking to emerge, in part through the ongoing process of 
Anglophone theorists assimilating ideas about sexual difference. Amongst these 
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currents are new directions in Irigaray’s later work. She asks how to cultivate 
relations between women and men as subjects of irreducibly distinct kinds, and her 
whole view of sexual difference shifts. She now maintains that, naturally, there are 
two different sexes, and that our culture must be changed to express both their natures 
(Irigaray 1996). This shift has contributed to extensive debate, still ongoing, about 
how to interpret Irigaray’s ideas and take them forward (see, e.g., Deutscher 2002, 
Stone 2006). 
 Beyond Irigaray, sexual difference feminism has helped to make possible the 
emergence of ‘material feminism’ (see Alaimo and Hekman 2008), which takes 
further the rejection of the sex/gender distinction. Rather than turning away from the 
biological body towards social gender for fear of falling into biological determinism, 
‘material feminists’ rethink materiality as an active, dynamic, creative force – an 
agency of change, supporting our efforts to change society for the better. Sexual 
difference theorists have attended to the body but in its psychical and cultural 
significance, as experienced. Effectively, these theorists bring the body into the fold 
of culture. For material feminists, though, this neglects the biological aspects of the 
body and how these aspects affect what psychical and cultural significance the body 
takes on. Material feminists thus aim to address the body’s specifically biological 
aspects, as they are theorized by the sciences – be they Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, neurobiology or quantum physics (see, respectively, Grosz 2004, Wilson 
2004, Barad 2007).  
 Likewise building on sexual difference theory’s attention to the lived body, a 
growing number of feminists are engaging with phenomenology to think about 
embodiment. This includes inquiry into natality – our existential condition as beings 
who are born of women; into women’s lived experiences of pregnancy, birth-giving 
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and mothering; and renewed attention to our experience as corporeal, fleshly beings 
(see, e.g., Schott 2010).  
 A final current deserving mention is feminist psychoanalysis. If the psyche has 
its own dynamics, these are not necessarily only those of the Oedipus and castration 
complexes – real as those complexes may be under patriarchy. There may be further 
fantasies, complexes, processes that Freud and Lacan missed. Amber Jacobs (2007) 
identifies a law of the mother – ‘you shall not be in the place of the generative mother 
yet (girl) or ever (boy)’ – which the West has repressed, yet which has covertly 
retained great power. Freud himself belatedly noticed the lifelong importance of 
women’s earliest, ‘pre-Oedipal’ ties to their mothers (Freud 1973). From this starting-
point I have explored a psychical pattern for mothers to relive with their young 
children their earliest relations with their own mothers (Stone 2011). 
 As this overview of emerging directions illustrates, ideas about sexual 
difference continue to feed into the diversity and vitality of contemporary feminist 
thought. These ideas are unlikely to lose their influence, given that they address issues 
fundamental to feminist thought – the significance of the body, how far social change 
can change the psyche, how being female can or could perhaps become a positive 
identity. So we can expect that sexual difference will be reconceived in unexpected 
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